Self-reporting and market structure by Rablen, M. & Samuel, A.
This is a repository copy of Self-reporting and market structure.




Rablen, M. orcid.org/0000-0002-3521-096X and Samuel, A. (2021) Self-reporting and 





This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. This licence 
allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even commercially, as long as you credit the 
authors for the original work. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Self-reporting and Market Structure
ByMATTHEW D. RABLEN* and ANDREW SAMUEL†
*University of Sheffield †Loyola University Maryland
Final version received 23 December 2020.
Many regulators utilize self-reporting, that is, wrongdoers reporting their own crimes to the authority, to
enforce regulations in a variety of market contexts. This paper studies the effectiveness of self-reporting
within the context of an oligopoly. We identify two important consequences of implementing self-
reporting (relative to no-reporting) for a welfare-maximizing regulator. First, if the regulator can control
only the audit probability and fine, then whether compliance rises or falls upon implementing self-
reporting depends on the level of competition. Second, if the regulator can also control the market size,
then the welfare-maximizing policy entails self-reporting but with more competition and lower compliance
than under no-reporting.
INTRODUCTION
Self-reporting is the reporting of harmful or non-compliant behaviour by the wrongdoer
to the enforcement authority. Many regulators utilize self-reporting to enforce their
regulations (Innes 2000). The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the UK
Environment Agency, for example, encourage firms to self-report environmental ‘crimes’
such as spills of oil or of untreated sewerage. Similarly, the US Department of
Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have recently
adopted self-reporting to regulate firms for compliance with food safety standards.1
The essence of self-reporting is that offenders are incentivized to self-report violations
in exchange for weaker sanctions, whereas those who do not self-report face stricter
sanctions if they are caught. Accordingly, self-reporting is beneficial to a regulator
because it need not audit those who confess to the crime, thereby saving on auditing
costs. Indeed, formal analysis of self-reporting (Malik 1993; Kaplow and Shavell 1994)
has shown that it can implement a given level of compliance at a lower cost than
enforcement without self-reporting (‘no-reporting’).2 These qualities make self-reporting
an attractive policy in an era of smaller budgets for regulators.
Previous research that studies the efficacy of self-reporting (Malik 1993; Kaplow and
Shavell 1994; Innes 1999, 2001) assumes a large number of (atomistic) agents or price-
taking firms. That is, this literature implicitly assumes that regulators are monitoring
firms that operate in perfectly competitive industries. We assert that this is not realistic
because most regulation occurs in imperfectly competitive markets. For example, the
EPA and the FDA regulate, respectively, the oligopolistic energy and pharmaceutical
industries, and the USDA regulates an agricultural industry that is less than perfectly
competitive.3 Despite this, little is known about how self-reporting interacts with market
structure—especially whether the effectiveness or impact of self-reporting varies with
market structure.
The goal of this paper is to study the effectiveness of self-reporting under non-
perfectly-competitive markets—that is, monopolistically competitive and oligopolistic
markets. The questions that we wish to address are as follows. First, how does the
optimal self-reporting policy vary by industry structure? Second, under what market
conditions will self-reporting yield a higher level of compliance? Finally, if a planner is
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unconstrained and can choose both the level of enforcement and the size of the market,
will implementing self-reporting give rise to more or less competitive markets?
To study these questions we develop a ‘Cournot-style’ model in which oligopolistic
firms generate a negative externality (e.g. environmental pollution) during production.
Firms can reduce this harm by investing in abatement. However, since abatement is
costly, in the absence of any regulation, firms do not abate. To incentivize abatement,
firms are audited by a regulator who can choose either a self-reporting regime or a no-
reporting regime to fine firms for causing harm. Enforcement, through auditing firms
with a given probability, is costly, and these costs may be either fixed or variable in
nature. Under a fixed cost structure, enforcement cost does not vary with firm size,
whereas under a variable cost structure it does.
Analysing this framework yields three important results concerning the value of
regulating via self-reporting relative to no-reporting.
First, by utilizing self-reporting, a regulator can introduce welfare-enhancing
regulations in markets where regulation would otherwise be inefficient to implement. To
elaborate, if the regulations that are needed to correct a market failure (such as an
external harm) are too costly, then it may be more efficient to permit the external harm
rather than impose even costlier regulation. In these situations the laissez-faire policy of
‘no regulation’ can be optimal in a second-best sense, even though regulating the harm
would be welfare-maximizing if regulation were costless (i.e. the first-best policy).
Framed in our context, in the absence of self-reporting, there exists a threshold level of
competition above which regulation becomes so costly that the regulator prefers the
laissez-faire outcome over no-reporting. But if the regulator implements self-reporting,
then for any level of competition, we show that the regulator prefers regulation (through
self-reporting) to the laissez-faire policy that would be (second-best) optimal under no-
reporting. Thus by utilizing self-reporting, it is always optimal to correct the market
failure, whereas under no-reporting it may not always be optimal to do so.
Second, if a regulator is constrained in that it cannot choose the level of competition,
self-reporting need not yield a higher level of compliance (relative to no-reporting) even
though it is always welfare-enhancing. Specifically, if enforcement costs are fixed with
respect to firm size, then the socially optimal audit probability and level of compliance
are higher (lower) under self-reporting than under no-reporting when the market is
sufficiently competitive (concentrated). If, however, enforcement costs vary with firm
size, then this result is reversed: the optimal audit probability and level of compliance are
higher (lower) under self-reporting than under no-reporting when the market is
sufficiently competitive (concentrated). Thus whether or not implementing self-reporting
yields a higher level of compliance, relative to regulation through no-reporting, depends
on the level of competition. Importantly, the nature of this effect is mediated by the
structure of enforcement costs: fixed or variable.
Third, if the regulator is unconstrained in that it can choose both the level of
enforcement and the number of firms, then the regulator always chooses to favour more
competition and a lower level of compliance, relative to a no-reporting regime. Thus self-
reporting allows for a larger, more competitive, market with larger consumer surplus, but
at the expense of lower compliance and greater harm. This result, importantly, implies
that there should be more partnership and joint enforcement between competition
(antitrust) authorities, which determine market concentration levels, and other regulators
such as the EPA.
It is insightful to relate these findings to the broader literature on self-reporting. The
main benefit to self-reporting is that the regulator can save on enforcement costs
2021] SELF-REPORTING AND MARKET STRUCTURE 783
Economica
© 2021 The Authors. Economica published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of London School of Economics and
Political Science.
(Kaplow and Shavell 1994; Malik 1993). Innes (1999, 2001) also identifies two further
advantages to self-reporting. First, if firms can engage in clean-up activities, then under
self-reporting firms always engage in clean-up, whereas under no-reporting firms clean-
up only when they are caught. Since clean-up is welfare-improving, self-reporting
improves welfare for this additional reason. Second, if firms can invest in costly detection
avoidance, then under self-reporting there is less avoidance. Since avoidance is wasteful,
self-reporting enhances welfare.
While these studies agree that self-reporting is welfare-improving, only Innes (1999)4
recognizes the possibility that implementing self-reporting can cause the level of
compliance to fall.5 Further, to date there has been no analysis of the exact conditions
under which this will occur. Indeed, as Toffel and Short (2011) note in their recent review
of the self-reporting literature: ‘[a]lthough this scholarship identifies some important
dynamics that underlie self-reporting . . . [its] connection to improving compliance or
reducing harm is unclear’. By introducing market structure into this framework, we show
that in the context of market regulation, this outcome is determined by the level of
competition and other market characteristics.
Besides the literature on self-reporting, this paper contributes to the small but
recently growing literature on the relationship between market structure and various
public and private enforcement mechanisms. Dechenaux and Samuel (2019) find that
whether a regulator prefers announced or surprise inspections (from a compliance
maximization standpoint) depends on whether or not the market is sufficiently
concentrated. In the context of private enforcement mechanisms, Daughety and
Reinganum (2006) study the effectiveness of liability rules in various market contexts,
and find that whether strict liability is preferred to negligence also depends on market
competition. Our paper contributes to this literature by characterizing the welfare-
maximizing policy; this has not so far been addressed, perhaps due to its complexity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section I sets up the basic model as well
as the market equilibrium. Section II studies the welfare-maximization problem under
self-reporting and no-reporting for a constrained regulator that cannot choose the level
of competition. Section III conducts the same analysis for an unconstrained regulator,
and Section IV concludes. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
I. THE MODEL
Consider a market with N≥1 oligopolistic firms that each produce qi units of a product.
The total market quantity is Q¼∑Ni¼1qi. The cost of producing each unit is c, and there
are no fixed costs of producing qi. Firms sell products to consumers with quasilinear
utility function Uðq,q0Þ¼ q0þuðqÞ, where good 0 is the numeraire, with p0 ¼ 1. We














Maximizing this utility function with respect to a standard budget constraint yields the
linear inverse demand
P¼ β γQ:
Besides the direct costs, producing qi units imposes a total negative cost (externality)
qih on society. This externality can be abated at the rate ai∈ ½0,1, so that the harm qih
Economica
© 2021 The Authors. Economica published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of London School of Economics and
Political Science.
784 ECONOMICA [JULY
occurs only with probability ð1aiÞ. Abatement, however, costs kðaiÞ per unit where we
assume that kðaiÞ¼ ka
2
i =2. Since abatement is costly, and the harm does not affect a
firm’s profits, a firm will not choose to abate unless there is some regulation. That is, the
laissez-faire level of abatement is zero.
To incentivize abatement, a welfare-maximizing regulator may choose to implement
either a self-reporting or a no-reporting regulatory regime, where z 2 {NR,SR} denotes
the no-reporting and self-reporting regimes, respectively. In the NR regime, each firm is
audited with probability qNR, and when harm has occurred (with probability 1ai) it is
fined FNR ∈ ½0,F per unit, where F is the maximal feasible fine. Thus in the NR regime, a
firm’s profit is





In a self-reporting regime (SR), if harm occurs, then the firm self-reports the
occurrence of harm with probability τi ∈ ½0,1, in which case it is fined FSR ∈ ½0,F. In
keeping with Kaplow and Shavell (1994), the firm is audited with probability qSR when it
does not make a report (or reports no harm), and is fined at the same rate FNR that
applies to unreported harm in the NR regime.6 Thus a firm’s profit in the SR regime is





The timing of this game is as follows.
1. Stage 1. The regulator chooses fqNR,FNRg in the no-reporting regime, and fqSR,FSRg
in the self-reporting regime.
2. Stage 2. Firms choose a and q.
3. Stage 3. Harm is realized or not.
4. Stage 4. In the SR regime, if harm occurs (with probability 1ai), then the firm
chooses whether or not to self-report it.
5. Stage 5. The regulator audits with probability qNR in the no-reporting regime, and
with probability qSR in the self-reporting regime when it does not receive a report.
Using backwards induction (and subgame perfection), we first solve the model in the
case of the SR regime. In stage 4 (taking quantities and abatement levels as given), firms
choose τ to maximize profits. The derivative of equation (2) with respect to τi is
qSR ð1aiÞFNRð1aiÞFSR:
Since 1ai ≥ 0, if qSRFNR ≥ FSR, then τ





Although we have not yet introduced the regulator’s welfare-maximization problem,
we find it convenient to note here that as long as auditing costs are increasing in the audit
probability, the regulator sets qSRFNR ¼FSR. Choosing qSRFNR>FSR cannot be optimal
because then qSR can be lowered (up to the point of equality) while also improving
welfare. Also, qSRFNR<FSR cannot be optimal as then firms would never self-report and
the equilibrium would be identical to the NR regime. Thus qSRFNR ¼FSR is optimal, so
firms always self-report when harm occurs.8 Thus equation (2) reduces to
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The first-order condition with respect to ai yields the profit-maximizing level of
abatement in the SR regime:
a ¼ minfqSRFNR=k,1g¼ minfFSR=k,1g:
For now we assume that the solution to a is interior (i.e. FSR=k<1), but in Assumption
1(c) below we ensure that this condition is always met.
Substituting the value for a into the profit function yields






Maximizing this expression with respect to the firms’ quantity yields the symmetric
Cournot–Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium is characterized in the following
lemma.
































Note that the two regimes affect the equilibrium quantity only through mz.
Since fines in the SR regime are chosen such that FSR ¼ qSRFNR, the algebraic
expression of the full marginal cost m is identical in both regimes, for given {ρ,F}.
Accordingly, although Lemma 1 specifies the expression for qz at the optimal
policy under the SR and NR regimes, the expressions for a, q and are identical in
both regimes, which is convenient analytically. As, however, the optimal levels of q
will not be the same in the two regimes, the quantities, profits and abatement
levels will not be identical.
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II. WELFARE ANALYSIS: CONSTRAINED SOCIAL PLANNER
Given the market equilibrium in Lemma 1 for some N, we study the regulator’s welfare-
maximizing choice of fines and audit probability. That is, in this section we assume that
the regulator is a ‘constrained social planner’ that takes the market size N as given.
Further, the regulator acts as a ‘Stackelberg leader’ that chooses its policy anticipating
firms’ reaction to its policy, identified in Lemma 1. In other words, given the fines, the
audit probability and the regime, firms choose the symmetric Cournot oligopoly
quantities and level of abatement derived in the previous section.
To identify the regulator’s objective, we follow most of the literature in economics
and assume that the regulator is a utilitarian (e.g. Mookherjee and Png 1995) that
maximizes the difference between the benefits and the costs to society. Then the expected
cost of enforcement for the regulator is given by C(.):
Cðq,δ,zÞ¼ gqδqNa1z¼SR , δ∈ f0,1g and g>0,(3)
where 1A takes the value 1 when condition A is true, and 0 otherwise. Here C(.) is the
product of the cost per audit gqδ, where g>0 is a scalar, and the expected number of
audits qNa1z¼SR . The parameter δ determines the structure of costs—that is, whether they
are fixed or variable in firm size (which is measured by q). When δ = 0, costs are fixed in
the sense that firm size does not affect enforcement costs; in this case g is exactly the
marginal cost of audit. If δ = 1, then costs are linear in firm size.9 Importantly,
equation (3) also helps to identify the benefit of self-reporting, first recognized in Kaplow
and Shavell (1994). Under self-reporting (z = SR), costs become a function of a, for in
expectation, the regulator need only audit the proportion a of firms who have not self-
reported causing harm.





where Q=qN is the equilibrium market size in the symmetric equilibrium characterized in
Lemma 1. In this benefit function we assume that fines are transfers from firms to society;
the net cost to society of a fine is therefore zero.
Given these costs and benefits, in the SR regime, the regulator chooses q and F to
maximize
WSR ¼ΦðqÞCðq,δ,SRÞ,
while in the NR regime, the regulator maximizes
WNR ¼ΦðqÞCðq,δ,NRÞ:
Note that the cost differential between the two welfare functions is critical to the well-
known result that self-reporting is optimal. Under self-reporting, the regulator needs to
audit only those firms that do not cause harm (with probability a). Under the no-
reporting regime, the regulator must always audit.
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Before proceeding to analyse the socially optimal choices, we make the following
assumptions for any regime z 2 {NR, SR}.
Assumption 1. The parameters in our model possess the following properties.
1. Demand is sufficiently strong; that is, β−c>k, so full abatement is feasible (for firms).
2. h>k.
3. hF−kg<kF.
4. The fine F is less than the level of monopoly profit.
While we leave the algebra to the Appendix, the intuitive justification for these
assumptions is straightforward. Assumption 1(a) ensures that firms produce a positive
quantity even under full abatement. Assumption 1(b) ensures that the marginal benefit
from abatement (a reduction in h) is greater than the marginal cost of abatement, ka, for
all a. Hence society wants to provide incentives for abatement (through regulation),
instead of the alternative, complete deregulation. Assumption 1(c) ensures that full
abatement is not optimal for the regulator. Note that if full abatement is optimal under
self-reporting, then there is no longer any gain from self-reporting because the
enforcement costs are identical in both regimes. This can be observed easily from
equation (3). As we are interested in evaluating self-reporting, we do not explore the case
where full abatement is optimal. Assumption 1(d) ensures that when the regulator
imposes a fine, it is always feasible for the firm to pay it. This follows because profits are
highest under a monopoly.
Under these assumptions the regulator’s welfare-maximizing problem involves
choosing q and F to maximize
Wz, z∈fNR,SRg,
subject to the constraint q≤k/F (for a=1 if and only if q=k/F, and it is never optimal to
raise q once a=1).
Our first step in identifying the welfare-maximizing policy involves the following
result concerning the optimal fine in the NR regime.
Lemma 2. Regardless of the cost structure, the fine FNR, which applies to unreported
harm in both the self-reporting and no-reporting regimes, is maximal.
Given this result, herein the fine FNR is the maximal fine F. A direct consequence of








These expressions yield various observations that aid our subsequent characterization of
the welfare-maximizing policies. First, it follows that when qSR>qNR, abatement will be
higher in the SR regime. In this case we say that enforcement is higher in the SR regime
compared to the NR regime. The reverse will be true when qSR<qNR. Second, when
qz ¼ 0, abatement is zero. Therefore a policy that implements qz ¼ 0 is effectively the
laissez-faire policy; if a policy implements qz>0, then some regulation or market
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intervention is welfare-maximizing. Accordingly, an increase in qz can be described as an
increase in enforcement.
Fixed enforcement costs
Let qz represent the welfare-maximizing audit probability. When enforcement costs are
fixed with respect to firm size (δ=0), the socially optimal audit probability possesses the
following characteristics with respect to the level of competition and the level of harm.
Proposition 1. The welfare-maximizing audit probability in the no-reporting regime,
qNR, may be higher or lower than the welfare-maximizing audit probability in the self-
reporting regime, qSR. Whether qNR is greater or smaller than qSR depends on the level of
harm h, the cost of enforcement g, and the level of market competition N. Specifically,
there exist thresholds h1,h2,h3 on the level of harm that are functions of g, with
h1ðgÞ>h2ðgÞ>h3ðgÞ>0, such that the following hold.
1. If the harm is sufficiently high so that h≥ h1ðgÞ, then there exist N1,N2,N3, with
N3>N2>N1 ≥ 1, such that we have the following.
1. If the market is sufficiently concentrated (N≤N1), then the audit probability is the
same in both regimes: qNR ¼ q

SR ¼ minfk=F,1g.
2. If the market is moderately concentrated in the sense that N1<N≤N2, then
enforcement is higher in the NR regime (qNR ≥ q

SR>0).
3. If the market is moderately competitive, in the sense that N2<N<N3, then
enforcement is higher in the SR regime (qSR>q

NR>0).
4. If the market is sufficiently competitive (N ≥N3), then the laissez-faire policy of
q

NR ¼ 0 is preferred under the NR regime, but regulation is still welfare-
maximizing under the SR regime; that is, qSR>0.
2. If the harm is moderately high so that h2ðgÞ≤ h<h1ðgÞ, then there exist N2,N3, with
N3>N2 ≥ 1, such that we have the following.
1. If the market is sufficiently concentrated, in the sense that N≤N2, then
enforcement is higher in the NR regime (qNR ≥ q

SR>0).
2. If the market is moderately concentrated in the sense that N2<N<N3, then
enforcement is higher in the SR regime (qSR>q

NR>0).
3. If the market is sufficiently competitive in the sense that N≥N3, then the laissez-
faire policy (qNR ¼ 0) is welfare-maximizing under the NR regime, but regulation is
still welfare-maximizing under the SR regime (qSR>0).
3. If the harm is moderately low so that h3ðgÞ≤ h<h2ðgÞ, then for any level of
competition (for all N), enforcement is higher in the SR regime and there exists an
N3 ≥ 1 such that if N≥N3, then the laissez-faire policy is welfare-maximizing under
the NR regime (qNR ¼ 0).
4. If the harm is sufficiently low so that h≤ h3ðgÞ, then for all levels of market
concentration, the laissez-faire policy is welfare-maximizing under the NR regime
(qNR ¼ 0), but regulation is always welfare-maximizing under the SR regime (q

SR>0).
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. Panel (a) depicts the optimal enforcement in
(h,N)-space, as described in the proposition, and panel (b) shows qNR and q

SR as
functions of N for the case in which h2ðgÞ<h<h1ðgÞ. Observe that the optimal
Economica
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probabilities fqNR,q

SRg generally differ, because while the marginal social benefit from q
is the same in either regime, the costs of enforcement differ at the margin. As first
explained by Kaplow and Shavell (1994), on the one hand, the marginal enforcement cost
tends to be lower with self-reporting because an increase in the probability of audit
applies only to deterred firms. On the other hand, the marginal enforcement cost tends to
be higher with self-reporting because an increase in the probability enlarges the pool of
firms subject to audit by making harm less likely. The magnitude of the former effect is
decreasing in q (for, as enforcement is tightened, an increasing proportion of firms
generate no harm), while the magnitude of the latter effect is increasing in q. It follows
that under the conditions of the proposition, there exists a (unique) point at which
marginal costs in the two regimes coincide.
Proposition 1 offers three key insights into optimal audit probabilities under the SR
and NR regimes.
First, under the SR regime, regardless of the level of harm or the market’s
concentration, it is always optimal to provide incentives for abatement by auditing firms.
In contrast, auditing is not always optimal in the NR regime (for some market
structures). Thus implementing a self-reporting regime permits welfare-enhancing
regulation in circumstances where the laissez-faire outcome is preferred to a no-reporting
regime (i.e. no regulation is optimal in a second-best sense because no-reporting is too
costly).
Second, whether or not auditing is optimal depends on both the level of competition
N and the level of harm h, because the total harm to society is proportional to Qh.
However, this does not mean (as is the case in, for example, Polinsky and Shavell (2000)
and much of the remaining deterrence literature) that a higher total harm Qh implies a
greater willingness to audit on the part of the regulator. Given some level of harm h0>h1,
the total harm under a monopoly, QMh
0, is less than the total harm under a more
competitive market, Qch
0, without enforcement. Nevertheless, in the NR regime, the
regulator may choose to audit the monopolistic market (where total harm is lower) but
not the more competitive market (where total harm is higher) if the latter case falls in the
region where N>N3 whereas the former case occurs in the region where N<N3 in
Figure 1. Indeed, it is only when the harm is sufficiently large and the market sufficiently
concentrated that the audit probability is positive under both regimes. The audit
probability may even attain its maximum, q=k/F, if the market is sufficiently
concentrated, a case that would essentially amount to continuous monitoring
(Dechenaux and Samuel 2019). Thus to determine whether or not auditing is optimal, the
regulator must account for both the level of competition and the per unit harm h; the
total harm Qh is not sufficient.
Third, although implementing the SR regime always allows for harm-reducing
regulation (regardless of the level of harm or market concentration), this does not imply
that the abatement level under the NR regime is always lower than that produced under
the SR regime. As seen in Figure 1(b), if N<N2, then implementing an SR regime can
lower abatement (relative to the ‘status quo’ NR regime), whereas the opposite is true if
N>N2. Consequently, when the level of competition is sufficiently high, the level of
abatement under self-reporting will be closer to full abatement, whereas when the level of
competition is low, the level of abatement under no-reporting more closely approximates
full abatement.10 Thus competition is ‘good’ for self-reporting in the sense that if markets
are sufficiently competitive, then the efficiency gains from self-reporting can be realized
fully without raising harm. Indeed, if a regulator were constrained (perhaps politically)
by the notion that any new policy implemented must lower the harm—a concern raised in
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the literature (Toffel and Short 2011)—then it will likely be easier to advocate for self-
reporting policies in more competitive markets.11
For the welfare-maximizing audit probabilities identified in Proposition 1, the
following comparative static result holds at an interior maximum.
Proposition 2. At an interior solution qz∈ð0,k=FÞ, z 2 {NR,SR}, the welfare-
maximizing audit probability possesses the following comparative static properties.
1. Under both the NR and SR regimes:
1. qz is strictly decreasing in market competition N and the slope of the demand
curve γ;
2. qz is increasing in the level of harm h and the strength of the demand β−c;








































FIGURE 1. (a) Welfare-maximizing audit probability in (h,N)-space. (b) Welfare-maximizing audit
probability and market size (competition).
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2. The fine rate F can affect qz differently in the NR and SR regimes:
1. qNR is increasing in F if the marginal benefit of an increase in q, Φq, is inelastic
with respect to q, and is decreasing in F otherwise;
2. qSR is decreasing in F.
The comparative statics with respect to h and β−c are intuitive. As the harm
increases, the regulator needs to increase the audit intensity. Similarly, when demand is
strong (i.e. β−c large), quantity produced increases, and consequently the harm also
increases. Thus audit intensity also rises. The effect of competition on the audit
probability, however, is particularly interesting. Increases in competition, as measured by
N, increase the marginal cost of raising the audit probability. Consequently, the optimal
audit probability declines withN (Figure 1(b)).
An increase in the fine rate has competing effects, which implies that whether the fine
and audit rate are complements or substitutes depends on the reporting regime. On the
one hand, an increase in F incentivizes firms to increase abatement. On the other hand,
this increase in abatement induces firms to lower their output. The proof of Proposition
2establishes that in the NR regime, the balance of these competing effects depends on
whether the marginal social benefit, Φq, is elastic or inelastic with respect to the
probability of audit. In the inelastic case, an increase in the fine rate increases the optimal
audit probability, so that the fine and the optimal audit probability are complements. In
the SR regime, an increase in F has a third effect: it increases the marginal cost of raising
the audit probability (CqF>0). This third effect is sufficient to ensure that in the SR
regime, the fine rate and the audit rate are substitutes in optimal enforcement. To
summarize, under the SR regime, F and the optimal audit probability are always
substitutes; hence an increase in F allows the planner to lower q, thereby reducing
enforcement costs. Such cost savings may not be enjoyed under no-reporting since qNR
and F may be complements. To our knowledge, this relationship between fine rates and
optimal enforcement under self-reporting has not been explored previously in the
literature.
Proposition 2 may also be used to understand the comparative static properties




SR, and N3, at which q

NR ¼ 0. In
particular, the comparative statics of N3 are identical in sign to those of q
, while
for N2, only the comparative statics effects for k and F can possibly differ in sign
from those of q. This implies that as the harm increases, the range of competition
(N ≥N3) in which the laissez-faire policy is optimal is smaller. In other words, even
for relatively high levels of competition, qNR>0. Intuitively, because the harm is
higher, the regulator chooses to audit under the NR regime even when the level of
competition is relatively high.
Further, Proposition 2 also claims that N2 (if it exists) is also increasing in h. Recall
that qNR>q

SR for N<N2. Thus as the harm increases, the interval of N for which qNR is
higher than qSR (and hence abatement is higher in the NR regime) is larger. Accordingly,
when h is large, a switch from the NR to the SR regime will lower the level of abatement
for even moderately competitive industries (N∈ðN1,N2Þ). Whereas when the harm is low
(h<h2), a switch to the SR regime increases abatement for all levels of market
concentration.
Finally, both N1 and N2 are decreasing in γ. Recall that γ is the slope of the demand
curve. Thus when demand is more inelastic, the range of competition over which self-
reporting yields a higher level of abatement grows.
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We now consider the case where costs are variable (i.e. δ=1 in equation (3)). Analogous
to the previous subsection, we characterize the optimal audit probability as a function of
h andN in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The welfare-maximizing audit probability in the no-reporting regime,
qNR, may be higher or lower than the welfare-maximizing audit probability in the self-
reporting regime, qSR. Whether qNR is greater or smaller than qSR depends on the level of
harm h, the cost of enforcement g, and the level of market concentration N. Specifically,
there exist thresholds ~h1ðgÞ, ~h2ðgÞ, ~h3ðgÞ on the level of harm that are functions of g, with
~h3ðgÞ> ~h2ðgÞ> ~h1ðgÞ>0, such that the following hold.
1. If the harm is sufficiently high so that h> ~h3ðgÞ, then for all levels of market
concentration, the level of enforcement is higher in the NR regime (~qNR ¼ k=F> ~qSR).
2. If the harm is moderately high so that ~h2ðgÞ<h≤ ~h3ðgÞ, then there exists an N2>1
such that we have the following.
1. If the market is sufficiently concentrated in the sense that N≤N2, then
enforcement is higher in the SR regime (~qSR ≥ ~qNR>0).
2. If the market is sufficiently competitive, in the sense that N>N2, then the level of
enforcement is higher in the NR regime (~qNR> ~qSR>0).
3. If the harm is moderately low so that ~h1ðgÞ<h≤ ~h2ðgÞ, then there exist N1,N2, with
N2>N1 ≥ 1, such that we have the following.
1. If the market is sufficiently concentrated, in the sense that N≤N1, then the laissez-
faire policy ~qNR ¼ 0 is welfare-maximizing under the NR regime, but some
regulation is still welfare-maximizing under the SR regime (~qSR> ~qNR ¼ 0).
2. If the market is moderately competitive, in the sense that N∈ðN1,N2, then the
level of enforcement is higher in the SR regime (~qSR ≥ ~qNR>0).
3. If the market is sufficiently competitive, in the sense that N>N2, then the level of
enforcement is higher in the NR regime (~qNR> ~qSR>0).
4. If the harm is sufficiently low so that h≤ ~h1ðgÞ, then for all market structures, the
laissez-faire policy ~qNR ¼ 0 is welfare-maximizing under the NR regime but some
regulation is still welfare-maximizing under the SR regime (~qSR> ~qNR ¼ 0).
We illustrate the salient features of this proposition graphically in Figure 2. Panel (a)
depicts optimal enforcement in (h,N)-space, and panel (b) shows ~qNR and ~qSR as
functions of N for the case in which ~h2ðgÞ<h< ~h3ðgÞ.
The main lesson from Proposition 3 is that the results with respect to N are
qualitatively the ‘inverse’ of the case where costs are fixed. Specifically, as seen in
Figure 2(b), given some level of harm h, at higher levels of competition (i.e. N>N2) the
optimal level of enforcement is lower under the SR regime than under the NR regime. In
contrast, when costs were assumed fixed, enforcement was higher under the SR regime
than under the NR regime for higher levels of competition. Accordingly, when costs are
variable, a regime switch from NR to SR in a highly competitive industry will lower
abatement when costs are variable, whereas when costs are fixed, a switch from NR to SR
will likely raise abatement in a highly competitive industry. Further, as can be seen in
Figure 2(b), when h∈ð~h2ðgÞ, ~h3ðgÞÞ, for lower levels of competition enforcement is higher
in the SR regime, whereas for higher levels of competition enforcement is lower in the SR
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regime. The main message from our analysis is that the impact of self-reporting on
compliance depends critically on both competition and the structure of the marginal cost
of enforcement (i.e. whether it is fixed or variable). This is especially the case for
moderate levels of harm between ~h1ðgÞ and ~h3. When the harm is sufficiently high or low
(cases (a) and (d) in Proposition 3), however, the audit probability does not depend on
market structure.
The following proposition further highlights the distinction between the cases δ=0
and δ=1.
Proposition 4. At an interior solution ~qz∈ð0,k=FÞ, z 2 {NR,SR}, the welfare-
maximizing audit probability under variable costs possesses the following comparative
static properties.
1. Under both NR and SR:
1. ~qz is strictly increasing in market competition N and the the level of harm h;



















































FIGURE 2. (a) Welfare-maximizing audit probability in (h,N)-space under variable costs. (b) Welfare-
maximizing audit probability and market size, under variable enforcement costs.
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2. The fine rate F, the strength of the demand β−c, and the cost of abatement k, can
each affect ~qz differently in the NR and SR regimes, but the relative magnitudes of
these effects in the two regimes, and their signs, are ambiguous.
Proposition 4 proves a clear visual feature in Figure 2(b): optimal enforcement is
increasing in the level of competition N. The intuition underlying this finding is that in
the variable cost case, an increase in N has two effects on the marginal cost of raising the
audit probability Cq. First, a higher N increases Cq, as increasing proportionally the
fraction of firms that are audited implies a larger absolute number of extra audits, the
larger is N. Second, however, higher competition endogenously reduces output per firm
q, thereby reducing the per-firm audit cost. In contrast, in the fixed cost case, only the
first of these effects applies.
A key difference between the fixed and variable cost cases is that the demand
parameters β−c and γ do not enter the cost function in the fixed cost case, but do
in the variable cost case. As a result, whereas a steepening of the demand curve
increases the optimal audit probability in the fixed case, it has no impact on the
optimal audit probability in the variable case. Also, whereas an increase in the
strength of demand increases the optimal audit probability in the fixed case, its
impact in the variable case becomes ambiguous in sign. For parameters such as β−c
that interact with optimal enforcement in a complex way, it is possible, for
prescribed parameter values, that the sign of the comparative statics effect differs
between the NR and SR regimes. However, as the relative magnitudes of the effect
between regimes is also complex, the divergence in signs (when present) can itself go
in either direction, depending on parameter values.
Finally, note that when costs are variable, the optimal audit probability and the
(maximal) fine may be complements or substitutes in either regime. Whereas when
enforcement costs are fixed, the optimal audit probability and fine are necessarily
substitutes in the SR regime (Proposition 2).
III. WELFAREANALYSIS: UNCONSTRAINED SOCIAL PLANNER
We now assume that the social planner can choose N as well as q in both the NR and SR
regimes. When moving from the NR regime to an SR regime, the regulator faces a
compromise. Simultaneously increasing N as well as q would potentially stimulate
competition and reduce harm, but both acts would also raise the marginal cost of
enforcement. Therefore if this latter effect were too large, then social welfare might
instead be maximized by increasing one of N and q, and decreasing the other choice
variable. Accordingly, the route to maximizing social welfare is not immediately obvious.
Here we show that if the social planner can choose N, then there will more competition
but higher levels of harm in the (socially optimal) SR regime. This result is summarized in
the next proposition.
Proposition 5. Let q̂,N̂ denote the socially optimal level of auditing and market size. If
enforcement costs are fixed (δ=0), then this socially optimal policy for an unconstrained
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Proposition 5 reveals an important finding: the socially optimal market size is higher
when self-reporting policies can be implemented. Specifically, in the fixed cost case, a
welfare-maximizing regulator will, if switching from the NR regime to the SR regime,
choose to lower the audit probability, as a consequence of which market competition
increases, as does the level of harm. Since welfare is always raised under self-reporting, it
follows that the socially optimal policy consists of implementing self-reporting. Given
Proposition 5 this, in turn, implies an increase in the market size N and therefore a
reduction in prices and larger consumer surplus.
Some intuition for this finding comes from Figure 3, which depicts the social
optimum in Proposition 5. The two lines qNRðNÞ and q

SRðNÞ depict the optimal choice of
audit probability for a given N in the NR and SR regimes. The two lines NNRðqÞ and
NSRðqÞ depict the regulator’s optimal choice of N for a given q (these functions have been
inverted to be drawn in (N,ρ)-space). The optimal pair ðN̂z, q̂zÞ, z 2 {NR,SR}, are found
at the intersection of qzðNÞ with N

zðqÞ. The optimal N
 in the NR regime is seen to be
non-monotonic in q. At low values of q, the industry generates large amounts of harm,
inducing a regulator to restrict its size. At large values of q, the marginal enforcement
cost of raising N becomes increasingly high, again leading a regulator to wish to restrict
N. The highest optimal choices of N therefore arise for intermediate values of q at which
both harm and marginal enforcement costs are not too high.
Switching to the SR regime alters the trade-off between harm and marginal
enforcement costs. Note that whereas self-reporting can be associated with either higher
or lower marginal enforcement costs with respect to increases in q, self-reporting is
always associated with lower marginal enforcement costs with respect to increases in N.
Intuitively, following an increase of DN in N, an extra q DN firms must be audited under
no-reporting, but only an extra q DN(1−a) firms must be audited under self-reporting.
Consistent with this point, in Figure 3 we see that NSRðqÞ>N

NRðqÞ for every value of q
such that a>0. The higher optimal N under self-reporting acts to reduce q, for—as we
proved in Proposition 2—the optimal audit probability is decreasing in N. As well as the
optimal N being always higher under self-reporting, it is also seen in Figure 3 to vary to a
greater degree in the choice of q. The interaction between q and N in the cost function is
given by CqN ¼N
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FIGURE 3. Socially optimal audit probability and market size under fixed enforcement costs.
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The greater variability in the optimal N under self-reporting therefore implies that Cq





Þ, which places NSRðqÞ and N

NRðqÞ at values below N2 in Figure 1.
Accordingly, with reference to Figure 3, when switching from the NR regime to the SR
regime, there are two effects on q, both of which are negative. The first is a discrete
downwards jump when switching from the line qNRðNÞ to the line q

SRðNÞ at N¼ N̂NR,
and the second is a move to the right along the line qSRðNÞ from N̂NR to N̂SR.
Similar intuitions apply to the variable cost case (δ=1), as depicted in Figure 4. It can
be shown that the social optimum again lies in the region where ~qNRðNÞ> ~qSRðNÞ, albeit
this occurs for ~NNR>N2 rather than ~NNR<N2. An important difference, however, is that
the optimal audit probability is increasing in N. This implies that in a switch from the NR
regime to the SR regime, although the optimal q falls on account of the move downwards
from ~qNRðNÞ to ~qSRðNÞ, this effect is offset by an upward movement in q along the line
~qSRðNÞ arising from an increase in N. Accordingly, whether the optimal q increases or
decreases from a switch from no-reporting to reporting remains unclear. Intractability
precludes a more definite answer.12
Finally, note that the policy in Proposition 5 can be implemented by introducing a
fixed entry cost y>0. Under this policy, firms enter the industry until their profits are
zero, given the fixed cost y. As profits tend to zero with N, the regulator can choose
q¼ q̂SR and an entry fee y to achieve N̂SR.
13
IV. CONCLUSION
Although economic analyses of self-reporting show that implementing such a policy
always raises welfare, there is still considerable dispute regarding its overall effectiveness
(Toffel and Short 2011). Many empirical studies find little evidence that implementing
self-reporting improves compliance rates (e.g. Esbenshade 2004; Vidovic and Khanna
2007). And other studies find that compliance falls under self-reporting (King and Lenox
2000). Consequently, some regulators have considered eliminating their self-reporting
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FIGURE 4. Socially optimal audit probability and market size under variable enforcement costs.
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In light of this debate, our paper makes a contribution towards understanding these
empirical findings and their implications for evaluating the impact of self-reporting. We
show that the impact of self-reporting on compliance is affected by strategic market
forces so that whether the optimal level of compliance is higher or lower under no-
reporting than under self-reporting depends on the level of competition. Since many
regulatory agencies regulate firms in oligopolistic contexts, our findings suggest that self-
reporting, though welfare-increasing, need not raise compliance and lower the harm.
Accordingly, it may not be appropriate to evaluate the effectiveness of self-reporting by
examining whether compliance rises or falls post-implementation.
Our results also imply that regulators introducing self-reporting need to consider the
level of competitiveness in order to determine whether harm will rise or fall. This is
especially important in the unconstrained social planner’s problem where we show that a
regulator chooses more competition while also ‘permitting more harm’ (Proposition 5).
This suggests an important policy implication: that there may need to be more
coordination between competition (antitrust) authorities and other regulatory bodies
that correct for externalities.
The result that under self-reporting the optimal ‘permissible’ level of harm may be
higher than under no-reporting is related to findings in Innes (1999). Albeit for very
different reasons, he finds that the level of ‘care’ in preventing accidents is always lower
under self-reporting than under no-reporting. Notably, we find instead that the level of
care (abatement) may be higher or lower under self-reporting than under no-reporting
depending on the level of competition. This suggests that market characteristics should not
be ignored when evaluating the benefits of enforcement policies such as self-reporting.
Our paper also identifies new benefits that are achieved from implementing self-
reporting. First, under self-reporting, the optimal audit rate and F are always substitutes
(when costs are fixed). Thus an increase in F lowers the audit rate, thereby reducing
enforcement costs. However, such cost savings will not always be realized in the NR
regime, as there the optimal audit rate and the fine need not be substitutes. Second, when
both the audit probability and the market size N can be chosen by the regulator (the
unconstrained case), the optimal market size—and therefore also consumer surplus—will
be higher in a self-reporting regime than in a no-reporting regime. Although previous
literature has examined some aspects of optimal enforcement in oligopolies (e.g.
Baumann and Friehe 2016), no study considers characteristics of the optimal market size
in relation to enforcement. As we see, studying this problem reveals an important finding
concerning the benefit of self-reporting.
We end by noting some extensions and ideas for future work. First, we did not
consider the possibility of free entry and exit in this market. This could be undertaken by
assuming that there is a fixed exogenous cost that is incurred by firms on entry. In this
case, the number of firms that enter the industry depends on this cost, similar to the
analysis in note 13 (except that here entry costs are exogenous, whereas there they are
chosen by the regulator). Once N is determined, our results are broadly similar to the
constrained regulator’s choices in that if the harm is sufficiently large (small) then the
optimal enforcement under the self-reporting regime is higher (lower) than the optimal
enforcement in the no-reporting regime. Consequently, when the harm is high (low),
fewer (more) firms enter the industry under the self-reporting regime. Second, while self-
reporting generates a welfare surplus in a model with homogeneous firms, it may not do
so if firms are sufficiently differentiated. Intuitively, in a vertically differentiated Bertrand
duopoly, a firm’s decisions to self-report will be a best response to the other firm’s
decision to report. Hence the impact on welfare is unclear. Finally, whereas we consider a
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standard ‘static’ Cournot setting, self-reporting could be analysed in a continuous time
setting with, for example, stochastic revelation of demand. We leave it to future
researchers to explore these avenues more closely.
APPENDIX
DISCUSSION OF ASSUMPTION 1
1. Quantity (and hence profits) are positive, that is, q>0 when a=1. Substituting a=1 into the




>0 or 2ðβ cÞk>0:
2. As discussed in the main text.









2ðβ cÞkð Þ FhkðFþgÞð Þ
2γk
:





which implies that hF−kg<kF.
4. Monopoly profit is given by maxqπz ¼ðβ γqmzÞq. We assume that monopoly profit exceeds
the fine rate F, so a firm can always afford to pay the fine F when levied.
PREAMBLE TO PROOFS

















The case of no-reporting corresponds to φ=0, and the self-reporting case to φ=1. Next, we
establish the expressions for the following derivatives:
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Proof of Lemma 1. Profit is given by πi,z ¼ðβ γQmzÞqi, z 2 {NR,SR}. Differentiating with
respect to qi gives the first-order condition β γQmz γqi ¼ 0. Imposing qi ¼ qz for all i (such that
Q¼Nqz) and solving for qz, the results in the lemma follow.
Proof of Lemma 2. Note that q is always post-multiplied by F in Φ, but not in C, where q appears
both independently and post-multiplied by F. Accordingly, social welfare can be written as
W¼ΦðqFÞCðq,qFÞ:(A4)
Consider lowering q and increasing F, holding qF constant. Then Φ(qF) is unchanged, but C(q,qF)









This observation implies that W must be maximized with respect to FNR at the maximal choice
FNR ¼F.
Proof of Proposition 1. We first characterize the optimal q. Using the expressions in the preamble,
the first-order condition for q is
ΦqCq¼ 0,(A5)
where
Φq¼NðqqwþwqqÞ, Cq ¼ gN 1þð2a1Þφð Þ:
Setting q=k/F in the first-order condition (A5), we solve forN to obtain
N1ðφÞ¼
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Next we prove the following claim.
Claim 1. ∂ðΦq=NÞ=∂N<0.













Rewriting the first-order condition in (A5) as NðΦq=NCq=NÞ¼ 0, an increase in N causes
Φq=N to decrease (Claim 1), thereby forcing Cq=N to decrease also in order to restore the first-
order condition. As Cq=N¼ g 1þð2a1Þφð Þ is independent of N, for it to fall, it must be that q
(and hence a) falls. It follows that q=k/F for all N≤N1ðφÞ. As N1ðτÞ is decreasing in φ, it follows
that q=k/F for all φ (and therefore in both the NR and SR regimes) when
N ≤N1 ¼ max
φ
N1ðφÞ¼
FðhkÞ 2ðβ cÞkð Þ
2γgk
1:
Finally, we need to ensure thatN1>1, which holds if
h>kþ
4γgk
F 2ðβ cÞkð Þ
≡h1ðgÞ:





From Claim 1, forN2 ≥ 1 we must therefore have
h≥














equation (A8) has a unique solution satisfying N3>1. By Claim 1, it must hold that q

NR ¼ 0 for all
N ≥N3.
Economica
© 2021 The Authors. Economica published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of London School of Economics and
Political Science.
2021] SELF-REPORTING AND MARKET STRUCTURE 801
Proof of Proposition 2. (Comparative statics of q)Let ɛa,b≡ðb=aÞð∂a=∂bÞ be the elasticity of a with
respect to b. We first prove a claim.
Claim 2. ɛΦq ,N<1 forN≥1.














Note that for N≥1, the left-hand side does not exceed 1/2, and the right-hand side necessarily
exceeds 1/2, hence the inequality holds as claimed.










As Wqq<0 is the second-order condition for a maximum, the sign of ∂q

z=∂x is the sign of Wqx.







































Cqð1þ ɛΦq ,qÞ=F if φ¼ 0,
CqɛΦq,q=F<0 if φ¼ 1,
 !
Wqk ¼ΦqkCqk,
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Proof of Proposition 3. When enforcement costs are variable, we have
Cðq,N;φÞ¼ gNqðq,NÞq 1½1aðqÞφð Þ:






On calculation it can be observed that both the left- and right-hand side terms in equation (A9) are






MC¼MCðq,N;φÞ¼ g ½1þð2a1ÞφðβmÞð1aÞ½1ð1aÞφqFð Þ:
Hence, asMCNR ¼MCðq,N;0Þ andMCSR ¼MCðq,N;1Þ, we may write
MCz ¼
g βmð1aÞqFð Þ if z¼NR,
ag 2ðβmÞð1aÞqFð Þ if z¼SR:
 
Hence it is clear that marginal benefit is increasing in N, while marginal cost is constant in N.
Thus, given the assumption of concavity of welfare with respect to q, it follows that qNR and qSR at
an interior solution that satisfies equation (A10) are increasing in N.
Next, we establish the following points.
1. At q=0,MCNR ¼ gðβ cÞ>0, whileMCSR ¼ 0.





, while MCSR ¼ g 2ðβ cÞkð Þ, where we note that





3. ∂MCNR=∂q¼2gF<0 at q=0, and ∂MCNR=∂q¼ gF>0 at q=k/F.
4. ∂2MCNR=∂ðq
2Þ¼ 3gF2=k>0.
5. ∂MCSR=∂q>0 for q 2 {0,k/(2F),k/F}.
6. MCSR is convex for all q 2 [0,k/(2F)) and concave for all q 2 (k/(2F),k/F]. This result, along
with the result in the previous point, implies thatMCSR is increasing in q for q 2 (0,k/(2F)).
7. At q=k/(2F),MCSRMCNR ¼
1
8
gk>0; that is,MCSR>MCNR at q=k/(2F).
Thus, since marginal costs in both regimes are continuous functions in q, and MCSR is
increasing in q for q 2 (0,k/(2F)), and MCSR>MCNR at q=k/(2F), there exists a q̂∈ð0,k=ð2FÞÞ
such that MCNR>MCSR if and only if q< q̂ (and MCNR ¼MCSR at q̂). Using these observations,
we now establish the claims in Proposition 3.
First, we show that qSR>0 for all N. Since MCSR ¼ 0 at q=0, as long as MBjq¼0,N¼1>0, we
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which is strictly positive because the right-hand side is increasing in h and positive at the smallest
value of h, namely h=β−c. Thus becauseMB is increasing in N,MB>MC at q=0, therefore qSR>0.










Therefore if h< ~h1ðgÞ, then for allN, qSR>qNR ¼ 0.









If h∈ ½~h1ðgÞ, ~h2ðgÞ, then as MB is increasing in N and given the properties of MCz concerning q,
there exist N1,N2, with N1<N2, such that qSR>qNR ¼ 0 for all N<N1, qSR>qNR>0 if N∈ ½N1,N2
and qSR<qNR if N>N2. If h>
~h2ðgÞ, then qNR>0, and there exists an N2 such that qNR<qSR if and
only if N<N2.
Finally, if MB at q=k/F and N=1 is greater than MCNR at q=k/F, then for all N we have















then qNR ¼ k=F>qSR.


























It follows that ∂~qz=∂N>0, ∂~qz=∂h>0, ∂~qz=∂γ¼ 0, ∂~qz=∂ðβ cÞ≷0, ∂~q=∂F≷0 and ∂~q=∂k≷0.
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Proof of Proposition 5. Using the characterization of the regulator’s objective function provided in
the subsection ‘Preamble to proofs’ above, the first-order conditions for {q,N} can be written as
ΦqCq¼ 0, ΦNCN ¼ 0,
where, when δ=0,
Cq¼ gN 1þð2a1Þφð Þ,(A12)
CN ¼ gq 1ð1aÞφð Þ>0:(A13)
Using this framework, the result in Proposition 5 is obtained by proving each of Claims 3–6 below.
Claim 3. At any solution of the first-order conditions for q andN, ∂N/∂q<0.







That is, at the optimal solution, the marginal rate of substitution between q and N with respect to
Φ must equal their rate of substitution with respect to costs. A straightforward calculation shows





Therefore N and q are substitutes, and at the optimum, ∂N/∂q<0.
Claim 4. At the social optimum (in the SR regime), q̂SR>k=ð2FÞ.
Proof. As C is homogeneous of degree 1 in N, we have CN ¼C=N, so C¼NCN. Hence
W¼ΦC¼ΦNCN. At N¼N
 we have ΦN ¼CN, hence W¼ΦNCN ¼ΦNΦN. By similar
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Thus if inequality (A14) is not satisfied at the highest value of β (which is h), then it is not satisfied
for all β. Similarly, if inequality (A14) is not satisfied at the lowest value of N (which is 1), then it is




then q cannot be part of a social optimum. Moreover, if inequality (A15) holds at some q0, then it






Hence q=k/(2F) cannot be part of a social optimum. Rather, it must hold at a social optimum that
q̂>k=ð2FÞ.
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Hence N̂SR>N̂NR, from Claims 3, 5 and 6. Again using the chain rule, the total effect on q̂ of an












Hence q̂NR> q̂SR, from Claims 3, 5 and 6.
NOTES
1. See https://www.epa.gov/compliance/epas-audit-policy, https://cedrec.com/news/index.htm?news_id=
20823 and https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/postmarketrequirements/re
portingadverseevents/default.htm (all accessed 11 January 2021). See also Toffel and Short (2011) for a
discussion of various self-reporting policies.
2. The term ‘no-reporting’ refers to a standard ‘Beckerian’ enforcement framework in which all firms are
audited and sanctioned with a given probability.
3. For example, according to US Census data for 2007 (US Census 2007), the (C4) concentration ratio for
offshore drilling (which is regulated by the EPA) is 50. Similarly, the FDA regulates animal antimicrobials
(C4>50) and medical devices (C4 ¼ 35).
4. In Section IV, we elaborate on an important difference between our finding in this regard and that of Innes.
5. Kaplow and Shavell (1994) note that the optimal audit probability may be higher or lower under self-
reporting than under no-reporting. But these authors do not follow this observation to its logical
conclusion, namely, that it implies that compliance may fall under self-reporting. We are able to show that
whether the audit probability is higher or lower under self-reporting is a function of market structure.
6. A priori, there is no reason why the fine for unreported harm in the SR regime must be the same as the fine
for unreported harm in the NR regime. Nevertheless, as we show in Lemma 2, the optimal fine in both these
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cases is maximal. Thus although we have not yet derived this result, we make this assumption to avoid
excessive notation.
7. Strictly, firms are indifferent between self-reporting or not when qSRFNR ¼FSR. In keeping with the
mechanism design literature, however, we assume that when they are indifferent, firms report truthfully.
8. This result also follows from the revelation principle.
9. If δ 2 (0,1), then costs are concave in firm size. We do not analyse this interior case here.
10. The second -best level under costly enforcement is higher or lower under the SR or the NR regime because
of the differential structure of enforcement costs between the two regimes.
11. Kaplow and Shavell (1994) show that, in general, the audit probability under self-reporting may be higher
or lower than the probability under no-reporting. As the fine is always maximal, it implies that the level of
harm may be higher or lower under self-reporting than in the no-reporting regime. Proposition 1 ‘tightens’
their result and shows that whether the audit probability in one regime is higher or lower than in the other
depends on the level of competition (see Figure 1).
12. We note as an aside, however, that in Figure 4—and in other numerical examples that we have tried—we
observe the outcome q̂NR> q̂SR, consistent with Proposition 5.




, z 2 {NR, SR}.
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